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R and R DIVORCE BLOG

Counsel Fees in a Matrimonial Action – Who has to pay?

April 30th, 2012

Is it true that under the new legislation, if you are the monied spouse you have to pay for not only your own legal fees but your spouse’s legal fees as well?  The answer is …Yes!

In an effort to level the playing field and allow both spouses in a matrimonial action to be able to afford legal counsel, under the new law, the monied spouse will likely have to pay a portion, if not all, of the legal fees incurred by both parties. Hence, advice to both the monied and non-monied spouse, nobody enjoys prolonged litigation and outrageous legal fees, so you are better off trying to attempt a solution sooner rather than later.

Things that you should consider to help keep legal fees down – don’t stop paying what you have been paying throughout the marriage.  If you are the monied spouse, who customarily paid the marital expenses in connection with your home, living expenses, food, clothing, etc., continue to do that, otherwise you may be faced with a motion and Court intervention.  That doesn’t mean that there will not be any Court intervention but it will certainly help keep legal fees down.

Make good faith attempts to identify the issues and reach a resolution.   Read the rest of this entry »


Legal Separation: What is it really about?

March 22nd, 2012

What exactly is a Legal Separation?

Many individuals believe that simply living separate and apart from your spouse constitutes a legal separation. However, that is not the case. If you are considering a legal separation, not living under the same roof isn’t enough. A legal separation is two individuals living separate and apart pursuant to a written Agreement, known as a Separation Agreement. That Separation Agreement covers all issues that would be included in a Divorce, such as:

- Equitable Distribution of Assets and Liabilities
- Custody and Visitation of Children
- Child Support
- Spousal Support/Maintenance
- Life Insurance
- Medical Insurance
- Payment of Counsel Fees

If you wish to divorce on the basis of a legal separation, can that be done right away or is there a waiting period?

The individuals have to wait a minimum of one year and comply with the Separation Agreement. Then, and only then, if either one of them chooses (it doesn’t matter which one), a party to the agreement can file for divorce with the Court.

Can you wait more than one year to file for divorce? Read the rest of this entry »


Do I have to live with my spouse during a divorce?

March 13th, 2012

The answer to that question really depends upon the individual factual circumstances of your case.  Generally, unless your spouse voluntarily vacates the marital residence and establishes another home, which would provide a legal basis to keep your spouse out of the marital residence, the court will normally not direct your spouse to leave.

The only exception would be if it is determined that his or her presence in the house creates an unsafe or improper environment.  Basically, what the courts will look at for practical purposes is whether or not there has been violence or threats of violence.  If that has occurred, it will generally provide a legal basis to get your spouse out of the marital home during the divorce action.

The other option if there is ongoing domestic violence or threats of domestic violence, is to go to Family Court and seek an order of protection excluding your spouse from the marital residence. Note, however that there are different types of orders of protection, and not all orders direct the spouse to leave the home.  The Family Court is very wary of being used as a “sword” to gain leverage in a divorce proceeding.  Depending on the judge and the allegations against your spouse, the court can do one of 3 things:

1. Decide that you are not entitled to an order of protection at all.

2. Decide that you are entitled to an order of protection that merely directs your spouse to refrain from improper conduct but allows him or her to stay in the house.

3. Direct your spouse to vacate the home and stay away from you and the home. Read the rest of this entry »


Do You Need a Prenuptial or Post-nuptial Agreement?

February 16th, 2012

Most people have heard of prenuptial agreements.  They are frequently mentioned in the context of celebrity divorces, where one of the spouses has sought to protect his or her significant assets in the event of a divorce.

The major difference between the two agreements is when it is executed. A prenuptial agreement is executed before a marriage.  A post-nuptial agreement is executed at any time after the marriage.  There is no time restriction as to when two individuals can enter into a post-nuptial.

Basically both prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements protect preexisting assets or assets that are to be received in the future such as those through employment, educational degrees, professional licenses, gift or inheritance by the titled spouse.

In first marriages, the individuals themselves, being just or only a couple of years out of school, more than likely don’t have much personally to protect except for their educational degrees and professional licenses as well as assets that they already received from an inheritance or gift. Read the rest of this entry »


Your Children – Should They Be Involved in Your Divorce?

February 16th, 2012

The most important thing to understand as a parent going through a divorce is not to involve your children. No matter what the ages of your children, they should be left out of the divorce process to whatever extent possible.

Children will be more or less aware of what is transpiring depending on their age. A 12 year old might ask questions that a 3 year old would not think about. Do answer their questions briefly and in an age appropriate manner, but most importantly, assure them that both of their parents love them. Parents must recognize that the divorce is between them, and that their children are innocent bystanders, not active participants.

Unfortunately, what frequently happens is that both parents become so embroiled in the emotion of the divorce process that they temporarily lose the ability to focus on what is best for their children. At times, parents will speak of adult matters either directly to or in the presence of their children. Sometimes parents will use their children as pawns to try to “get back” at the other parent, without realizing the harm that they are causing the child. Read the rest of this entry »


Lemieux v. Lemieux Long Term Maintenance

January 14th, 2011

LEMIEUX, Appellant, v LEMIEUX, Respondent. (Index No. 17857/03)

2006-10302, 2007-00070

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT

2008 NY Slip Op 1510; 48 A.D.3d 644; 852 N.Y.S.2d 347; 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1493
February 19, 2008, Decided

COUNSEL: Conrad J. Rybicki (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, N.Y. [Marshall D. Sweetbaum] of counsel), for appellant. Rubin & Rosenblum, PLLC, Commack, N.Y. (Debra L. Rubin of counsel), for respondent.

JUDGES: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, WILLIAM E. McCARTHY, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JJ. RITTER, J.P.,

FLORIO, McCARTHY and DICKERSON, JJ., concur.

In an action, inter alia, to annul a marriage and for ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals (1) from a decision of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), dated October 4, 2006, and (2), as limited by his notice of appeal and brief, from so much of a judgment of the same court entered December 18, 2006, as, after a nonjury trial, and upon the decision, and upon annulling the marriage on the ground of fraud, awarded the defendant maintenance in the sum of $ 300 per week commencing on October 4, 2006, and continuing until the defendant reaches the age of 66, dies, remarries, or cohabitates, whichever is sooner.

[**645] Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision (see Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509, 472 NYS2d 718 [1984]); and it is further, Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further, Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court was not authorized to make a maintenance award in this annulment action because Domestic Relations Law § 141, which provides that maintenance may be awarded in a matter where an annulment has been granted on the ground of the mental illness of one of the parties, necessarily limits the court’s authority. He contends that since [*2] the parties’ annulment was based on fraud, the court erred in making an award of maintenance. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the maintenance award is excessive in both amount and duration. The Supreme Court had the discretion to make an award of maintenance in this annulment action based on fraud. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2), the court has discretion to make a maintenance award in any matrimonial action (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2]; see also Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1962, ch 313 ["Proposed Section 236 . . . deals with a wife's right to alimony in annulment, separation and divorce actions, domestic and foreign. It unifies and broadens the discretion of the court in all classes of matrimonial actions. It replaces comparable provisions included in . . . Civil Practice Act Sections 1140-a, 1155, 1164, 1169, 1170 and 1170-b"]). Domestic Relations Law § 141 simply provides additional procedural and substantive detail with respect to an action to annul a marriage based upon five years’ incurable mental illness of one of the parties, to ensure that the disabled spouse is cared for and does not become a public charge (see Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law § 141; see also Bancroft v Bancroft, 288 NY 323, 326, 43 NE2d 63 [1942]). Domestic Relations Law § 141 does not, however, limit the class of annulments in which the court can award maintenance as provided for in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) (see Local Govt. Assistance Corp. v Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 2 NY3d 524, 544, 813 NE2d 587, 780 NYS2d 507 [2004] ["Generally, a statute impliedly repeals a prior statute only if the two are in such conflict that it is impossible to give some effect to both. If by any fair construction, a reasonable field of operation can be found for (both) statutes, that construction should be adopted"] [citations omitted]).

[***349] The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in [**646] making the maintenance award to the defendant (see DeVries v DeVries, 35 AD3d 794, 796, 828 NYS2d 142 [2006]; Zengxiu Liu v Cuizhi Zhu, 5 AD3d 476, 772 NYS2d 565 [2004]).

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J.P. Florio, McCarthy and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


Collaborative Law

July 13th, 2010

I had the pleasure of taking additional training in the area of Collaborative Law this past week. This is an excellent process for divorcing parties who are desirous of avoiding the emotional and economic costs of the litigation process, ending their marriages in a civilized fashion, and achieving a result fashioned by both. Since each party has a legal representative, it also creates a level of comfort for both parties, where one may feel “overpowered” by the other in a mediation setting.


No Fault Divorce, etc.

July 7th, 2010

The New York State Assembly has passed a three bill package aimed at reforming NY’s divorce laws.    NY, which is currently the only state that still requires grounds for divorce, will have a no fault provision that will allow one spouse to state under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for a period of at least six months.      This legislation should simplify and lessen the cost of the divorce process.    The two additional bills address provisions for temporary maintenance as well as attorney and expert fees for the non-monied spouse.     Additional information will be provided as it becomes available.


Mongelli v. Mongelli Improperly Imputed Income

January 24th, 2010

Rubin & Rosenblum, PLLC, Commack, N.Y. (Debra L. Rubin of
counsel), for appellant.
Eric Dubinsky, Westbury, N.Y., for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Grob, Ct. Atty. Ref.), entered November 24, 2008, as, upon a decision of the same court dated July 31, 2008, made after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant 50% of the appreciation of the marital residence from the date of the marriage, awarded him a separate property credit in the sum of only $48,000 for the marital residence, imputed income to him in the sum of $100,000, directed him to pay child support in the sum of $1,924 per month for the parties’ two minor children until the emancipation of the older of those children and, upon emancipation of the older minor child, to pay child support in the sum of $1,308 per month until the emancipation of the younger of those children, and awarded the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of $15,000.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and the facts, by deleting from the fifteenth decretal paragraph thereof the sums of “$1,924.00,” and “$1,308.00,” and substituting therefor the sums of “$1,356.77,” and “$922.60″ respectively; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

View the full case


Glassberg v. Glassberg Unequal Distribution

December 30th, 2009

In New York, the Court is required to “equitably” distribute all marital property in a divorce action. In the case of a long a term marriage, it is often assumed that “equitable” means “equal.” However, that is not always the case.

In Glassberg v. Glassberg, decided on April 15, 2009, Debra L. Rubin successfully argued to the Court that the wife should receive more than 50% of the marital estate as there was not an equal economic partnership, where the wife worked full-time as a teacher and handled virtually all household duties with minimal assistance from the husband. The husband was disbarred as an attorney during the marriage, and thereafter, worked several jobs, making minimal contributions to the marriage. After trial, the Suffolk County Supreme Court determined that the wife was entitled to receive 65% of the net proceeds of the sale of the marital residence and 65% of her retirement assets in recognition of the husband’s “limited, sporadic, unreliable and inconsistent” support of the marriage.

Former Attorney’s ‘Sporadic’ Economic Support Results in Small Share of Marital Property